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Abstract
How do people attribute responsibility in situations where the contributions of multiple agents
combine to produce a joint outcome? The prevalence of over-determination in such cases makes
this a difﬁcult problem for counterfactual theories of causal responsibility. In this article, we
explore a general framework for assigning responsibility in multiple agent contexts. We draw
on the structural model account of actual causation (e.g., Halpern & Pearl, 2005) and its exten-
sion to responsibility judgments (Chockler & Halpern, 2004). We review the main theoretical
and empirical issues that arise from this literature and propose a novel model of intuitive judg-
ments of responsibility. This model is a function of both pivotality (whether an agent made a
difference to the outcome) and criticality (how important the agent is perceived to be for the
outcome, before any actions are taken). The model explains empirical results from previous
studies and is supported by a new experiment that manipulates both pivotality and criticality.
We also discuss possible extensions of this model to deal with a broader range of causal situa-
tions. Overall, our approach emphasizes the close interrelations between causality, counterfactu-
als, and responsibility attributions.
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Three police marksmen killed a barrister during a siege at his house in London. The
barrister was drunk and brandishing a shotgun. Earlier on that afternoon he had ﬁred shots
out of the window; a 5-hour siege ensued, with a large number of police surrounding the
house. During the siege police negotiators spoke to the barrister. He was distressed and
suicidal, but the negotiators were unable to persuade him to surrender. After holding up a
suicide note at the window, the barrister aimed his riﬂe at the police. He was shot dead in
a volley of bullets. The post-mortem revealed that the barrister died from three critical
gunshot wounds, to the brain, heart, and liver, each of which “would have been capable of
causing death in their own right.” Moreover, the post-mortem stated that “the likely sur-
vivability of the brain wound, heart wound, or liver wound would have been very low,
even if one was artiﬁcially in an intensive care unit at the time it happened.” An inquest
ruled that each of the police shots was “lawfully ﬁred”; that is, the police used reasonable
force in defense of themselves or others. However, the jury criticized the police handling
of the siege. They argued that the police should have considered letting the barrister’s
wife, or his close friend, speak to him during the siege; that the police gave insufﬁcient
weight to the fact the barrister was an alcoholic, who was drunk and therefore vulnerable;
and that the police command structure was inadequate. Despite these criticisms, the jury
decided that none of these shortcomings contributed to the barrister’s death.
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This tragic case illustrates the close links between causation, counterfactuals, and
responsibility attributions. For example, the jury in the inquest had to decide whether the
police handling of the siege contributed to the barrister’s death. Presumably, this required
considering counterfactual situations where the police did not make these mistakes, and
determining whether the fatal shooting would still have resulted. For instance, what
would have happened if the barrister’s wife had been allowed to contact him earlier in
the siege? Would she have been able to pacify her husband? This is a crucial but difﬁcult
question. The jury ruled that it would not have made a difference to the ﬁnal outcome,
whereas the family and friends of the barrister argued the opposite. Indeed, during the
siege the police decided that allowing the wife to speak to the barrister might endanger
her life, or lead to a hostage situation, or accelerate the barrister’s suicide by allowing
him to say good-bye to his wife. These are a complex set of issues that hinge upon both
causal and counterfactual thinking.
The case also provides a real-world example of over-determination, which plays a cen-
tral role in philosophical discussions of causality (Collins, Hall, & Paul, 2004; Moore,
2009) and is seen as a major problem for standard counterfactual theories of causation.
The ofﬁcial causes of death, as stated in the post-mortem, were the three gunshot wounds.
This conclusion was supported by two counterfactual claims, both of which go beyond
the kind of counterfactual analysis offered by the standard theory due to Lewis (1973,
1986). Indeed, these more sophisticated counterfactuals ﬁt well with a modiﬁed counter-
factual account (Halpern & Pearl, 2005) that will be explored in this article. Finally, the
case also raises issues of responsibility and blame. The police marksmen were found to
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ble, because they carried out their actions in reasonable self-defense (or defense of oth-
ers). This shows that attributions of causal responsibility do not automatically translate to
attributions of blame or legal responsibility (Shaver, 1985). Moreover, the judgment about
legal responsibility here also seems to invoke counterfactual thinking—a marksman’s shot
was reasonable if, without it, the victim would have endangered the lives of the marks-
men or their colleagues.
In this article, we will explore a general framework for assigning causal responsibility
in multiple agent contexts. We draw on the structural model account of causality (Pearl,
2000/2009; Halpern & Pearl, 2005; Woodward, 2003), and its extension to responsibility
judgments (Chockler & Halpern, 2004). Building on this theoretical work, we will propose
a novel model of intuitive judgments of responsibility that is a function of both pivotality
(whether an agent made a difference to the outcome) and criticality (how important the
agent is perceived to be for the outcome, before any actions are taken). This model
explains empirical results from previous studies (e.g., Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2010; Zul-
tan, Gerstenberg, & Lagnado, 2012) and is supported by a new experiment that manipu-
lates both pivotality and criticality. We will also discuss possible extensions of this model
to deal with a broader range of causal situations. Overall, our approach emphasizes the
close interrelations between causality, counterfactuals, and responsibility attributions.
1.1. Legal aspects of responsibility
Although our focus is on intuitive judgments of causal responsibility, it is instructive
to consider some aspects of the legal conception of responsibility. A key idea in contem-
porary theories of legal responsibility (e.g., Cane, 2002; Hart, 2008; Honor  e, 1999) is that
the function of responsibility is both backward and forward looking. Retrospective (or
historical) responsibility concerns issues of accountability for what has actually happened,
and is the basis for blame and punishment. Prospective responsibility concerns duties and
obligations for future events: the prevention of bad outcomes and the production of good
outcomes (Cane, 2002). An example is Hart’s notion of role responsibility, where some-
one takes responsibility for a speciﬁc set of tasks. The distinction is readily applied to the
siege case. One can consider the retrospective responsibility that the marksmen, and the
police command more generally, actually bear for the barrister’s death. But one can also
consider their prospective responsibilities (before the barrister was shot); namely, to safe-
guard the lives of bystanders, relatives, and the police, and to maintain law and order.
Although legal commentaries tend to focus on retrospective responsibility, Cane (2002)
argues that prospective responsibility is equally important. The legal function of responsi-
bility attributions is not simply to punish bad behavior in the past, but to prevent it occur-
ring in the future. Indeed Cane states: “historic responsibility ﬁnds its role and meaning
only in responding to nonfulﬁllment of prospective responsibilities” (2002, p. 35).
It is natural to extend this argument to the function of responsibility attributions in
everyday (non-legal) contexts. Presumably, people’s intuitive judgments should also be
sensitive to both forward- and backward-looking concerns. In parallel with the legal liter-
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spective evaluations. This article will likewise build ﬁrst upon accounts of retrospective
responsibility. However, as discussed later in this article, the notion of prospective
responsibility emerges as an important factor in people’s intuitive attributions, even when
they are making purely retrospective judgments.
1.2. Counterfactual models of causation
The analysis of causality has been an ongoing problem in philosophy and psychology
ever since Hume (1748/1975). There have been many attempts to deﬁne causation in
terms of non-causal concepts such as regularities (Mackie, 1974), probabilities (Suppes,
1970), counterfactuals (Lewis, 1986), or physical processes (Dowe, 2000). None of these
reductionist programs has achieved any consensus, and the debate continues (Beebee,
Hitchcock, & Menzies, 2009). The advent of the structural model framework (Pearl,
2000/2009; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 2000; Woodward, 2003) has sharpened many
of the debating points and introduced a novel conception of causality in terms of inter-
ventions and counterfactuals. In short, the structural model approach proposes that A
causes B if and only if there are potential interventions on A that would lead to changes
in B (or changes in the probability distribution over the value of B). Here, the causal re-
lata are variables, and causal relations between variables are represented by modiﬁable
structural equations (see Woodward, 2003, for an accessible account).
A key feature of this framework is that it is non-reductionist. Causal relations are
deﬁned in terms of potential interventions (which themselves appeal to causal assump-
tions). We see this as an advance rather than a shortcoming, especially with regard to
psychological theorizing. Rather than search for a reductive deﬁnition, causality is
accepted as a primitive notion, and the causal model framework formalizes and clariﬁes
the relations between causal models, probability, interventions, and counterfactuals (see
Pearl, 2000/2009; Sloman, 2005). This avoids the problem, particularly acute for counter-
factual theories, of grounding or justifying counterfactuals without appeal to causal
knowledge (cf Edgington, 2011; Woodward, 2011). The structural account allows for
close interrelations between causal and counterfactual claims, while accepting that the
former are not reducible to the latter.
1.2.1. General versus actual causation
Philosophical analyses of causation distinguish between general and particular causal
claims. A general claim—such as “smoking causes cancer” or “shootings cause deaths”—
refers to classes of events or properties, and represents a generic causal relation/mecha-
nism between these classes, without specifying a particular instantiation of the relation.
In contrast, a particular causal claim refers to an actual case in which the causal relation
holds. For example, that Joe’s smoking caused his cancer, or that marksman A caused the
victim’s death.
General causal claims are central to scientiﬁc enquiry and play a major role in predic-
tion and control (Pearl, 2000/2009; Woodward, 2003). Thus, causal knowledge about bal-
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of shooting someone at close range. However, general causal beliefs also serve as the
background knowledge base needed to address questions of actual causation. To approach
the question of whether marksman A’s shot killed the victim, we draw on generic causal
knowledge and assumptions, even though this knowledge is not by itself sufﬁcient to deli-
ver our ﬁnal judgment.
Actual causal claims also play a role in science, especially in the interpretation of
empirical ﬁndings to support more general causal theories. Some branches of science also
concern actual causation directly such as theories about the big bang, or the evolutionary
history of species. In addition, actual causal claims are critical in many practical and
social contexts, in particular those involving explanation and responsibility attribution
(e.g., law, history, politics, everyday social interactions). Despite this ubiquity, there is no
generally agreed-upon deﬁnition of actual causation, and the various attempts in the
philosophical literature all suffer from difﬁculties (Beebee et al., 2009). An attractive
aspect of the structural model approach is that it offers a unifying framework for both
general and actual causation (Halpern & Pearl, 2005; Pearl, 2000/2009). It also maintains
a close relation between causation and counterfactuals at both levels. Thus, both general
and actual causal claims imply, and are supported by, counterfactuals. The relation is not,
however, reductive or deﬁnitional.
1.2.2. The standard counterfactual model
On the standard counterfactual model of causation (Lewis, 1973, 1986), “actual”
causal claims are analyzed in terms of counterfactuals. Roughly, c causes e if and only
if: (a) c and e are both true, (b) if c had not occurred, then e would not have
occurred. For example, when enquiring whether Joe’s smoking caused his cancer, one
needs to consider whether Joe would still have contracted cancer if he had not smoked.
If the answer is negative, then one concludes that Joe’s smoking did indeed cause his
cancer.
This deﬁnition is appealing in its simplicity and corresponds to the “but-for” test used
in legal liability.
2 It shifts the burden for assessing the causal claim entirely onto the
determination of the counterfactual “If not c, then not e,” and thus promises a reductive
account of actual causation (and potentially general-level causation too). There are, how-
ever, numerous difﬁculties with the standard counterfactual account (Collins et al., 2004;
Moore, 2009). We will focus on the problem of over-determination, vividly illustrated by
our earlier example of the shooting of the barrister in the siege. Recall that three marks-
men each shot the victim, and the coroner judged that each of these shots, by itself, was
sufﬁcient to kill the victim. The counterfactual test seems to give the wrong answer in
such cases. It fails to attribute causality to any of the marksmen’s shots, because for any
particular shot, the victim would still have died even if that shot had not been ﬁred, as
the other shots would have killed him.
There have been various attempts to solve this problem, but it is doubtful that the sim-
ple counterfactual account has the resources to deal with such cases, or a whole class of
related problems (pre-emption, double prevention, trumping, see Collins et al., 2004;
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the counterfactual “if not c, then not e” comes out true. For example, if marksman A had
not shot, then the victim would not have died in exactly the way he did. However, this
defense is problematic. Often the outcome of interest is insensitive to small variations in
its exact speciﬁcation. This is particularly clear in the siege shooting. The exact details of
the shooting (e.g., its precise timing) do not alter the coarser-grained outcome that the
victim died, and this is the critical variable in deciding causal responsibility in this situa-
tion (cf. Woodward, 2006; Lewis, 2000).
1.2.3. Structural model account of causation
The structural model framework has led to several related accounts of actual causa-
tion (Halpern & Pearl, 2005; Hitchcock, 2001, 2007a,b; Pearl, 2000/2009; Woodward,
2003). We will focus on the account proposed by Halpern and Pearl (2005), although
the key points are similar across the different versions. At the heart of the structural
model approach is the idea that causality can be represented in terms of functional
relations between variables.
3 Thus, the causal relations between a set of variables is
represented by a set of structural equations. These structural equations express informa-
tion about the effects of potential interventions. To say that A causes B (represented
by the equation B = A, or the directed graph A?B) is to claim that there are a set of
possible interventions on A (forced changes in the value of that variable) that change
the value of B (or the probability distribution over B’s values).
4 The functional rela-
tions between sets of variables are supposed to represent autonomous mechanisms in
the world.
A causal model is a set of variables together with a corresponding set of functional
relations. By necessity a causal model of any real-world setup will leave out many
details. Indeed, the choice of variables will often depend on the modeler’s perspective
and goals, and thus have a strong degree of relativity. However, once the variables
are selected, the structural equations that correctly relate these variables are deter-
mined by the world not the modeler (see Halpern & Hitchcock, 2010). In this sense,
a causal model aims to represent the causal processes and mechanisms operating in
the world.
To illustrate, we will construct a small-scale causal model of the siege example (Pearl,
2000/2009, models a ﬁctional case that is very similar). Our model only uses six binary
variables; more complicated models are possible, but the simpliﬁed model captures the
key variables and causal relations. The variables in the model are as follows: BA repre-
sents the proposition that the barrister aims his shotgun at the police; PO represents the
proposition that the police command issues an order to be prepared to shoot; MS1, MS2,
MS3, represent the propositions that marksman 1, marksman 2, and marksman 3, respec-
tively, each shoot at the barrister; BD represents the proposition that the barrister dies.
Each variable expresses a proposition that can be either true (value = 1) or false
(value = 0).
The structure of the causal model is shown by the causal graph in Fig. 1. The directed
arrows from BA to MS1, MS2, and MS3 represent the claim that the barrister’s aiming
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arrows from PO to MS1, MS2, and MS3 represent the claim that the police order is a
causal pre-condition for the marksmen to shoot. The directed arrows from MS1, MS2,
and MS3 to BD represent that each of the shots are potential causes of BD. The graph
does not show the combination functions for variables that have multiple parent causes.
These are speciﬁed by the form of the structural equations.
The structural equations linking the variables in the causal model are as follows:
MS1 ¼ min(BA, PO);MS2 ¼ min(BA, PO);MS3 ¼ min(BA, PO):
These three equations represent the assumptions that, for each of the marksmen, if the
police command issue an order to prepare to shoot (PO = 1) and the barrister aims his
shotgun at the police (BA = 1), then the marksman will shoot (e.g., MS1 = 1, MS2 = 1,
MS3 = 1); otherwise none will shoot.
The key equation linking the marksmen’s shots to BD is given in the following:
BD ¼ max(MS1, MS2, MS3):
This equation represents the assumption that any one of the marksmen’s shots is sufﬁ-
cient for the barrister to die.
5 If one or more of the marksmen shoot (e.g., MS1 = 1), then
the barrister will die (BD = 1). If none shoot, then the barrister will not die.
Police order
(PO)
Barrister aims
(BA)
Marksman 1 shoots
(MS1)
Marksman 2 shoots
(MS2)
Marksman 3 shoots
(MS3)
Barrister dies
(BD)
Fig. 1. Simple causal model of siege example.
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deterministic relations. For example, each marksman’s shot might independently raise the
probability of the victim dying (rather than guaranteeing it). This would correspond to
the noisy-OR function in a probabilistic causal model (Pearl, 2000/2009). For illustrative
purposes, we will stick with deterministic models, but the key points carry over to the
more general probabilistic context.
Before moving to questions of actual causation, it is worth highlighting some distinc-
tive features of the causal model framework. A causal model serves as an “oracle for
interventions” (Pearl, 2000/2009) in the sense that one can use the model to predict the
consequences of potential interventions. For example, we can use the current model to
predict what happens if we intervene by stopping one of the marksmen from shooting
(e.g., setting the variable MS1 = 0). This intervention would not alter the dependency of
BD on the other two marksmen’s ﬁring (MS2 or MS3). Moreover, due to the special way
in which interventions “modify” the graph structure, this intervention does not change the
values of PO or BA. The ability of the causal model framework to model the conse-
quences of interventions allows it to capture crucial components of causal reasoning and
(as we shall see) is critical for the evaluation of counterfactual claims.
So far we have constructed a general-level causal model of the siege, without including
speciﬁc information about what values the variables took in the actual situation. Setting up
the causal model (which can involve nontrivial choices about the appropriate variables and
the functional relations) is a pre-requisite for making actual causal judgments but does not
determine these judgments. The next step is to consider the ascription of values to the vari-
ables in the model. A useful concept is that of a causal world—which is a causal model in
which each variable is instantiated at a particular value (not necessarily the value it takes
in the actual world). One of these causal worlds will correspond to the actual world. In the
siege example, the police command did issue an order to prepare to shoot, the barrister did
aim his shotgun at the police, all three marksmen ﬁred, and the barrister died. Therefore,
the actual world is represented by assigning all variables a value of one.
Note that the instantiated causal model can be used to support counterfactual reasoning
(Pearl, 2000/2009). For example, we can enquire whether the barrister would still have
died if marksman1 had been distracted and failed to shoot. On the current causal model
the answer is yes. The antecedent of the counterfactual involves an imagined intervention
on MS1 to set its value = 0. As noted above, this does not alter the other dependencies
in the model, nor does it change the fact of whether the barrister aims at the police (BA).
Given that BA = 1, we can infer that the barrister would still die (BD = 1), because both
the other marksmen would still have shot (MS2 = 1 and MS3 = 1).
6
1.2.4. Actual causation—counterfactual dependency under certain contingencies
We are now in a position to consider a deﬁnition of actual causation based on the
structural model approach (Halpern & Pearl, 2005). We will not present the formal
aspects of this deﬁnition but will summarize the key intuitions. Halpern and Pearl retain
the basic counterfactual notion that one event c (or state of affairs) causes another event
e if and only if there is a counterfactual dependence between the two events, such that if
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7 However, their crucial extension is
that counterfactual dependence is evaluated relative to certain contingencies (or causal
worlds), not necessarily the actual world. This allows the account to deal with cases of
over-determination, pre-emption and several other classic problems for counterfactual the-
ories. Effectively, the proposal is that a (general-level) causal model is used to establish
whether a counterfactual dependence holds between a putative cause–effect pair, condi-
tional on certain other (counterfactual) interventions on the model. In short, c causes e if
and only if c is pivotal for e under certain contingencies (causal worlds), not necessarily
the actual world.
8
Of course, the plausibility of this extension depends on ﬁnding a principled way to
decide which contingencies are allowable when assessing whether one event is an “actual
cause” of another. Halpern and Pearl (2005) offer a complex set of conditions that aim to
capture the intuition that one should only invoke contingencies “that do not interfere with
active causal processes.” For example, when evaluating whether marksman1′s shot was a
cause of the BD, it is legitimate to consider a possible world where the other marksmen fail
to shoot (see below); but when evaluating whether the barrister’s behavior (in aiming his
gun at police) was a cause of his death it is not legitimate to consider a world where none
of the marksmen ﬁred. In the latter case, one is disrupting the active causal processes that
are critical to the claim that the barrister’s behavior caused his death. The question of
which contingencies are allowable is non-trivial and is the subject of ongoing debate (Halp-
ern & Hitchcock, 2010; Hiddleston, 2005; Hopkins & Pearl, 2003). However, for current
purposes, we focus on the relatively straightforward cases of over-determination, which
underpin the general framework of causal responsibility to be developed in a later section.
1.2.5. Over-determination resolved
The structural account offers a novel solution to the problem of over-determination
(which has plagued counterfactual theories). The basic idea is that when several causes
over-determine an outcome (such that each is sufﬁcient for the outcome), each cause
qualiﬁes as an “actual cause” of the outcome because in a causal world where the other
causes are removed (by hypothetical interventions), the outcome counterfactually depends
on the remaining cause. In other words, even though in the actual world the effect would
still have occurred if the cause had been absent, there is a hypothetical world where the
other (over-determining) causes are removed, and in that world the effect would not have
occurred without the target cause.
This solution is nicely illustrated with the siege example. Consider the question of
whether marksman1 is an “actual cause” of the barrister’s death. In the actual world
marksman1′s shot (MS1) is not pivotal for the death, because of the other two marksmen.
However, consider a causal world where the other two marksmen are changed to not
shooting (i.e., setting MS2 = 0, and MS3 = 0). In this world markman1′s shot is pivotal
to the barrister’s death (if the marksman1 had not ﬁred, the barrister would not have
died). The same argument applies to both of the other marksmen, so all three marksmen
are ruled in as causes of the barrister’s death (which conforms to our intuitive judgments
about the case).
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cases, resonates with the judgments made by the experts in the siege case. Consider the
post-mortem statements made with regard to the causes of the barrister’s death. First, it
was stated that each shot “would have been capable of causing death in their own right.”
This is naturally interpreted as asserting that under causal worlds where only one marks-
man shoots, that individual shot would have been pivotal to the barrister’s death. Second,
a more subtle use of counterfactual reasoning occurs when the post-mortem states that
“the likely survivability of the brain wound, heart wound or liver wound would have been
very low, even if one was artiﬁcially in an intensive care unit at the time it happened.”
Translated into the terminology of the structural account, this asserts that even under a
contingency where the victim was placed in intensive care (and thus treated immediately),
he would still have died. In this latter case, rather than simply change the values of the
variables in the causal model, a new variable is introduced (immediacy of intensive care),
and set at a speciﬁc value. The claim is that even under this contingency, each of the
marksmen’s shots would still have killed the barrister. Thus, the real-world reasoning of
the coroner demonstrates the interplay between causal and counterfactuals claims, and in
line with the structural model approach, suggests that causal claims are evaluated in terms
of counterfactual dependence under contingency.
Note that the structural approach also sanctions the ascription of causality to the barris-
ter’s own actions. According to our simple model of the situation, if the barrister had not
aimed his shotgun at the police, then the marksmen would not have ﬁred, and the barris-
ter would not have died. Of course, the current causal model greatly simpliﬁes a complex
situation. But it is re-assuring that it captures the key causal judgments.
1.2.6. Potential shortcomings of the structural model approach
The structural model account of actual causation deals with many of the problem cases
in the philosophical literature, including over-determination and pre-emption. However, it
struggles with some counter examples, in particular cases where the same causal structures
and variable assignments nevertheless yield different intuitions about judgments of actual
cause (Hiddleston, 2005; Hopkins & Pearl, 2003). Various reﬁnements to the structural
approach have been suggested to address these shortcomings (e.g., Halpern & Hitchcock,
2010), but no consensus has been reached on these problem cases (Hall, 2007; Hitchcock,
2007a,b). More generally, the strategy of searching for necessary and sufﬁcient conditions
of actual causation, characteristic of most theories of actual causation (including Halpern
& Pearl, 2005; Woodward, 2003), is open to criticism. Glymour et al. (2010) argue that
this strategy has led to increasingly complex sets of conditions, as new counterexamples
are encountered, but these deﬁnitions are still based on intuitions derived from only a very
small subset of possible causal structures. Moreover, they show that adding causal vari-
ables to simple models can generate new problems that are not readily solved by the cur-
rent deﬁnitions (and actually set alternative versions of the structural model in conﬂict).
This is a valid criticism of the current philosophical theories of actual causation.
Although it is premature to rule out the possibility of ﬁnding a satisfactory deﬁnition of
actual causation, it is possible that a unique deﬁnition will not be forthcoming (especially
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used). This criticism is less pertinent to psychological models of causal judgment insofar
as these models rarely consist in necessary and sufﬁcient conditions. At most psychologi-
cal models advance general principles that can be highly dependent on contextual and
individual factors. However, the dangers of generalizing from a subset of causal cases are
very real, as is the possibility that intuitive judgments are not stable for complex cases,
and we will discuss these issues after presenting the empirical studies.
Another potential shortcoming of the structural model pointed out by Glymour et al.
(2010) is that it presents a static model of actual causation, and thus does not capture the
notion that a cause is often a change of state (e.g., a happening or a trigger; see also
Steward, 2010). This stems from the structural model’s conception of an event as a set of
possible worlds rather than a transition between states. This is an important point and will
be discussed in more detail in the ﬁnal section. Although it does not undermine the
empirical work in this article, it does suggest new lines of empirical research.
Irrespective of whether the structural model account, or successive reﬁnements of it,
can capture all the philosophical problems, we believe that the approach provides a good
starting point to explore intuitive judgments of causation. It serves as a precursor for a
novel account of causal responsibility, and a template for exploring psychological attribu-
tions in a principled manner.
2. A structural model of responsibility
Most accounts of actual causation focus on the binary question of whether something
is a cause. However, in contexts where multiple agents combine to bring about an out-
come (such as the overdetermination cases) it is natural to consider a more graded notion.
This becomes even more pertinent when actual causal judgments are used for assignments
of blame or credit. Indeed, graded judgments of responsibility are made in a broad range
of social contexts—team games, business collaborations, legal sentencing, politics, medi-
cal negligence—whenever a group of agents act in concert to produce a joint outcome.
Building on the structural model of causation, Chockler and Halpern (2004, henceforth
CH) propose a formal account that allows for graded degrees of responsibility and
blame.
9 They illustrate the problem with a voting example. Suppose that 11 members of
a committee vote for either candidate A or B. Compare the situation where A wins the
vote 11–0 with the situation where A wins 6–5. In both cases, all members who voted
for A are responsible for A’s victory, but a natural intuition is that the members have a
higher degree of responsibility for the outcome in the 6–5 result than the 11–0 result. CH
argue that this intuition is based on the fact that in the 6–5 case each member’s vote was
pivotal, in the sense that for each member, if they had voted the other way, then candi-
date A would have lost. In contrast, in the 11–0 case, no individual member’s vote was
pivotal in this sense. However, this is not to absolve the members of any responsibility.
An important part of CH’s approach is to provide a quantitative measure that distin-
guishes these situations, without absolving some voters of responsibility.
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cause to deﬁne a metric for assigning degrees of responsibility. Recall that c is an actual
cause of e iff e counterfactually depends on c under some contingency (not necessarily
the actual world). In short, c causes e iff c is pivotal for e in an appropriate causal world.
Using this deﬁnition of actual cause, CH propose a deﬁnition of responsibility such that
the degree to which ci is responsible for e (out of a set of causes c1…cn), is determined
by the distance between the actual world and the causal world where ci is pivotal for e.
More precisely, CH deﬁne the degree of responsibility Resp of ci for e as
Respðci;eÞ¼1=ðN þ 1Þ;
where N is the minimal number of changes that have to be made to the actual world in
order for e to counterfactually depend on ci. Here, Resp is relative to a causal model and
the values taken by its variables in the actual world. The fewer the number of changes
needed to make ci pivotal for e, the higher the degree of responsibility that ci bears for e.
When ci is already pivotal for e in the actual world, then ci is assigned Resp = 1. When
ci is not judged an actual cause of e (by the counterfactual criteria), then ci is assigned
Resp = 0.
This metric is readily illustrated with the voting example. In the situation where candi-
date A won the vote 11–0, none of the individual members, considered on their own, were
pivotal to the outcome. Take one speciﬁc member (Fred). If Fred had voted for candidate
B rather than A, A would still have won, so in the actual world Fred’s vote is not pivotal
for the outcome. However, suppose that we change the votes of ﬁve of the other members
from A to B. That is, imagine a world where the vote is split 5–5 without counting Fred’s
vote. In this world, the outcome (A or B wins) depends counterfactually on Fred’s vote.
In other words, it takes ﬁve changes to the actual world to make Fred’s vote pivotal (so
N = 5), and thus he is assigned Resp = 1/(1 + 5) = 1/6. The same analysis applies to each
of the 11 members who voted for A, so all of them bear responsibility = 1/6.
In the situation where A wins 6–5, each of the members is already pivotal to A’s win.
If any of them had voted for B, then A would have lost. Because no changes are required
to the actual world (N = 0), each member who voted for A bears responsibility
Resp = 1.
10
The degree of responsibility analysis also applies to the siege example. Each marksman
gets responsibility Resp = 1/3 for killing the barrister, because for each marksman two
changes are needed to make his shot pivotal to the barristerr’s death (i.e., changing the
other two marksman from ﬁring to not ﬁring). By this analysis, the barrister’s own behav-
ior (in aiming his shotgun at the police) is assigned responsibility Resp = 1, because his
behavior was pivotal to his death in the actual world.
One notable feature of the CH account is that it allows for more than one agent to
receive full responsibility for the same outcome. In other words, it does not assume that
there is a ﬁxed sum of responsibility for an outcome that is divided among the contributing
agents. This feature chimes with some philosophical discussions of moral responsibility.
For example, Zimmerman (1985) argues that multiple agents can be fully responsible for
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diminution.” This also accords with legal practice, where, for example, sentences for mur-
der are not diminished merely by the number of perpetrators involved. Despite its accor-
dance with moral intuitions and legal practice, however, it is an open empirical question
whether people will assign “full” responsibility to multiple agents for the same outcome.
The experimental work discussed in this article suggests that people do so, and do not
restrict themselves to dividing a ﬁxed sum of responsibility among multiple agents.
Critical to the CH account is the ability to quantify the number of changes that
move one from the actual world to an appropriate hypothetical world. In the two exam-
ples above it is relatively straightforward to apply, because the variables are pre-deﬁned
and each change corresponds to a change in value of a binary propositional variable.
But in some situations it might be less clear exactly what constitutes a change, and
thus how changes are to be counted. A lot will depend on how the initial causal struc-
tural model is constructed. It might be argued that this is again a feature rather than a
bug in the structural approach: It acknowledges that the choice of causal model and
variables is an intrinsic part of any dispute about causal responsibility. This is an
important issue for future work, because the proposed analysis of responsibility hinges
upon the notion of changes to a causal world. We discuss the issue of the unit of
change in a later section.
The deﬁnition of degree of responsibility given by CH is not yet an account of blame
(or credit). It does not take into account the intentions of the agents, their knowledge or
foresight about the consequences of their actions, or the justiﬁability of their reasons for
acting (e.g., the marksmen were acting in self-defense). Such factors are crucial determi-
nants of judgments of blame in both theory (Heider, 1958; Shaver, 1985) and practice
(Gerstenberg, Lagnado, & Kareev, 2010; Hilton, McClure, & Sutton, 2010; Lagnado &
Channon, 2008). To avoid any confusion on this point, we will often refer to the CH deﬁ-
nition of responsibility as causal responsibility. In addition to this concept, CH propose a
deﬁnition of blame that takes into account the epistemic states of the causal agents. In
short, they deﬁne blame in terms of the expected degree of responsibility, relative to the
epistemic state of the agent. So an agent is not automatically to blame for something he is
causally responsible for; it depends also on his beliefs and knowledge. The classic exam-
ple of this is the doctor who administers a drug to a patient, and the patient subsequently
dies from a very unusual allergic reaction. The doctor is a cause of the patient’s death, but
in this case not to blame, because the outcome was completely unexpected by the doctor.
(In legal cases, the situation is slightly more complex, because the critical question is
whether the doctor could have “reasonably” foreseen the adverse consequence.)
Empirical evidence shows that people’s blame judgments are sensitive to the episte-
mic states of the agents (Lagnado & Channon, 2008). The CH model can explain some
of these data, but it does not account for the role of an agent’s intentions. This means
that the CH model is not a complete model of blame attributions, although it does cap-
ture some important features. Future developments could include explicit causal model-
ing of the internal mental states of the agents, such as their beliefs, desires, intentions,
and reasons.
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same outcome, where the agents are members of the same group or team, and share the
same beliefs, knowledge, and intentions. More complex situations can be explored at a
later stage, but for now we restrict ourselves to testing the bare bones of the structural
approach. Moreover, at this point we look mainly at whether people’s intuitive attribu-
tions conform to the formal model, without close scrutiny of the psychological processes
that underpin these judgments.
2.1. Intuitive judgments of responsibility
The structural model approach presents a formal framework for assigning causation
and responsibility that aims to match our reﬂective (considered) judgments. It provides a
principled method for attributing responsibility and can deal with contexts in which
multiple agents contribute to the same outcome. How well does this approach apply to
people’s intuitive attributions, especially in group contexts, where over-determination is
rife? As noted, this is a critical question in psychology, where responsibility attributions
are a prevalent part of social interactions, in diverse areas such as sport, law, business,
politics, and everyday gossip. Before presenting a novel experiment that addresses this
question, we review some previous empirical tests of the structural model approach (and
the CH model in particular).
2.2. Sensitivity to causal structure
A central claim of the structural approach is that responsibility judgments are sensi-
tive to causal structure, both in terms of the network of causal relations between the
relevant actions and events (the causal graph), and the causal functions that dictate how
multiple causes combine to yield an outcome (given by the structural equations). The
latter is particularly relevant in group situations where the individual contributions of
each member are combined to determine the overall group result. Three common func-
tions are summation, conjunction, and disjunction (cf. Steiner, 1972). In the summative
case, each individual member contributes to the group result, and their contribution is
proportional to their own individual performance. For example, in a tug-of-war, each
member of the team contributes to the overall team performance, and this contribution
is proportional to their individual “pulling power.” In the conjunctive case, each member
also contributes to the group outcome, but here each member must satisfy a speciﬁc
threshold or criterion. Thus, when individual performance is measured by a binary vari-
able (e.g., pass or fail), a conjunctive case requires that every member pass for the team
to win. For example, consider a human triangle in an acrobatic display. If any one of
the acrobats fails in his or her positioning, the team will fail overall. In the disjunctive
case, the performance of a single individual is sufﬁcient for the team outcome. Thus, in
the binary variable context, so long as one team member passes the team wins. A real-
world example is a team quiz, where the team wins a point as long as one member of
the team gets the right answer.
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sibility attributions. This is because the relation between an individual member’s perfor-
mance and those of his team members varies across these functions. The structural model
makes explicit predictions about how responsibility attributions should vary depending on
the functional relations between team members. According to the structural model the
degree of responsibility attributed to a team member for the team’s result depends on that
member’s own performance (e.g., his success or failure in his individual task) and the per-
formance of other members, because if the outcome is over-determined, the actual world
needs to be changed to make the agent pivotal (the more changes needed, the less respon-
sible the member is). This makes responsibility attribution sensitive to the combination
function, and implies distinctive patterns in disjunctive versus conjunctive contexts.
Imagine a simple game setup, where a team has four members, each of whom can pass
or fail their individual task. With a disjunctive function, only one individual pass is
needed for the team to win the game. In the case where only one team member passes
his task, attribution is simple: that member gets full responsibility for the win (Resp = 1)
and the other members get nothing (Resp = 0). Now consider the situation where two
members pass. The win is over-determined, and neither member is pivotal. According to
the structural model, both these members get responsibility Resp = 1/2, because for either
of them it would take one change to make them pivotal to the team win (i.e., by changing
the other member from pass to fail). A similar argument applies when three members
pass, with each of these members receiving Resp = 1/3, and when four members pass,
with each receiving Resp = 1/4. More generally, for each member who passes their indi-
vidual task, their responsibility for the team win increases as the number of other success-
ful members decreases. In comparison, consider the case where none of the members
succeed and therefore the team loses. All members have full responsibility (Resp = 1) for
the team loss, because each is pivotal (in the actual world) for the result. If any of them
had succeeded in their task, the team would have won.
In contrast, consider a conjunctive function, where the team only wins if all four mem-
bers pass their individual tasks. When the team wins, each member is pivotal: If any one
of them changes from pass to fail, then the team loses. Thus, each member is fully
responsible for the win. However, things are different when the team loses. Consider the
situation where all members fail. In this case, each member gets Resp = 1/4 for the team
loss, because three changes need to be made to make a member pivotal. Now consider
the situation where two members succeed. The two members who fail now receive
Resp = 1/2 for the loss. More generally, as the number of members who succeed
increases, the responsibility of the member who fails increases (until the limit where that
member is the only one who fails, and is assigned full responsibility for the loss).
To summarize, the structural model implies the following patterns: for disjunctive
games, the degree of responsibility assigned to a successful member (for a team win)
decreases with additional members who succeed, whereas all members get full responsi-
bility for a team loss; for conjunctive games, the degree of responsibility assigned to an
unsuccessful member (for a team loss) increases with additional members who succeed,
whereas all members get full responsibility for a team win.
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Gerstenberg and Lagnado (2010) constructed a novel experimental paradigm to explore
some of the predictions of the structural model. Participants played “the triangle game”
in teams of four players including the participant and three hypothetical players and then
attributed responsibility to each player (including themselves) for the team’s win or loss
using a sliding scale from 0 to 10. In the triangle game, each player is asked to estimate
the number of triangles in a complex ﬁgure under a tight time constraint. The deviations
of the individual answers from the correct answer determined the team outcome accord-
ing to a rule that differed in three between-subjects conditions. In the Sum condition, the
team won if the sum of the deviations of each player was six or less. In the Max condi-
tion, the team won if all players deviated by 2 or less. Finally, in the Min condition, the
team won if at least one of the players answered correctly. Note that in the Max condi-
tion, the function that determines the team outcome is conjunctive for a win but disjunc-
tive for a loss, whereas in the Min condition, the function is disjunctive for a win, but
conjunctive for a loss.
Gerstenberg and Lagnado (2010) found that the structural model (Chockler & Halpern,
2004), which assigns responsibility on the basis of the minimal number of individual out-
comes that have to be altered to make a player under consideration pivotal, explains
responsibility attributions better than a simple counterfactual model. However, responsi-
bility attributions were also sensitive to the deviation of a player’s answer from the cor-
rect answer. Larger deviations were associated with more blame for losses and less credit
for wins, even when they did not affect the team outcome. For example, a deviation of 3
and a deviation of 4 in the Max condition both fail to pass the maximal criterion of 2
deviations, but the former attracted less blame for a team loss compared to the latter. This
ﬁnding will be addressed in a later section of this article.
Here, we complement the analysis in Gerstenberg and Lagnado (2010) by focusing on
over-determination situations, as they occur in the Min and Max conditions. Fig. 2 shows
the credit attributions in the Min condition and the blame attributions in the Max condi-
tion as a function of the minimal number of changes to outcomes of other players
required to make a player pivotal. As predicted by the structural model, credit in the Max
condition and blame in the Min condition to an individual player decreased with the num-
ber of changes that would have been required to make the player pivotal.
In summary, the data provided support for the structural model, although people’s
judgments were sensitive to the degree to which player’s estimates deviated from the cor-
rect answer, irrespective of whether a threshold criterion was reached.
2.4. Complements and substitutes
The data from the triangle game show that responsibility decreases with the number of
players who share it in situations of over-determination. However, this pattern can also
be explained by a simple diffusion of responsibility model (cf. Latan  e & Darley, 1968),
in which a ﬁxed amount of responsibility is shared among all players that succeed (or
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the responsibility assigned to an individual team member depends in a nontrivial way on
the performance of that player’s teammates, and the causal function that combines each
member’s performance into the team outcome. Zultan et al., (2012) introduced two asym-
metric team games to allow for a clean comparison of the effect of one group member’s
outcome on the responsibility attributed to another. In their experiment, the individual
task consisted of the dot-clicking game, in which a dot on the computer screen is reposi-
tioned each time the player clicks on it. The goal is to click on the dot a certain number
of times within a given duration. Participants practiced playing the game themselves, but
in the judgment phase of the experiment they took the role of external observers and
attributed blame to individual players whose team lost the challenge.
The two team challenges are presented in Fig. 3. In Challenge 1, both players C and D
as well as at least one out of A and B have to succeed in order for the team to win the
challenge. In Challenge 2, D has to succeed and either C or both A and B. In Challenge 1,
player A is a substitute of player B, but a complement of player C, whereas in Challenge 2
the opposite holds. Players are substitutes if their individual contributions combine in a
disjunctive fashion and complements if their contributions combine conjunctively. Com-
pared to a baseline in which all players failed, the structural model predicts that A’s
blame will increase if his complement succeeded (e.g., C in Challenge 1 and B in
Challenge 2). If A’s complement succeeded, one less change is needed to make A pivotal
for the loss. In contrast, the model predicts that A’s blame will decrease (compared to the
baseline) when his substitute succeeded (e.g., B in Challenge 1 and C in Challenge 2). In
a situation in which A’s substitute succeeded, one more change is needed (namely chang-
ing the substitute to having failed) to make A pivotal compared to the baseline.
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Fig. 2. Mean responsibility attributions in situations of over-determination in the triangle game of Gersten-
berg and Lagnado (2010) separately for credit in the Min condition and blame in Max condition.
Note: Error bars indicate  1 SE.
1052 D. A. Lagnado, T. Gerstenberg, R. Zultan/Cognitive Science 37 (2014)Zultan et al. (2012) varied the number of participants who failed in their task: either
all four players, all-but-B or all-but-C.
12 A simple diffusion model predicts that the blame
assigned to player A increases when the number of group members who failed decreases
(as there are fewer people now who share the blame). In contrast, the actual blame attrib-
uted to player A was always lower when his substitute peer succeeded than when his
complementary peer succeeded. Thus, player A received more blame in Challenge 1
when player C succeeded (his complement) than when player B succeeded (his substi-
tute). In Challenge 2, in which the relationships of complementarity and substitution were
reversed, A was blamed more when B succeeded than when C succeeded. While these
predictions follow naturally from the structural model, a simple diffusion of responsibility
cannot explain the differences to A’s blame since the same number of players failed in
each situation.
The results also showed an effect that was not predicted by the structural model: In
Challenge 1, participants blamed players C and D more than A and B in a situation in
which all players failed. However, the minimal number of changes to make, for example,
A or C pivotal is the same. Two changes are required to make A pivotal, namely chang-
ing C and D. Similarly, a minimum of two changes are needed to make C pivotal, for
example, changing D and A. However, note that there is an important asymmetry
between A and C. Whereas there is only one way to make A pivotal (through changing
C and D), there are multiple ways to make C pivotal (through, e.g., changing D and A
or D and B). Zultan et al. (2012) extended the structural model to allow for different
ways in which a player can counterfactually become pivotal. This “multiple-paths”
model provides a formal way to attribute higher responsibility to individuals who are
pivotal in more than one hypothetical world, taking into account both the number of
such hypothetical worlds and their “distance” from the actual world. The extended model
correctly predicts that player C incurs more blame than player A in the described
situation.
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Fig. 3. Diagrams of two different team challenges used in Zultan, Gerstenberg, and Lagnado (2012) which
differed in terms of which players have to reach a performance criterion ≥ c in order for the team to win
the challenge.
Note: Curly braces indicate that contributions combine in a disjunctive fashion.
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The results from Gerstenberg and Lagnado (2010) and Zultan et al. (2012) conﬁrm that
the structural approach to responsibility successfully explains attributions to players who,
in retrospect, would not have altered the team outcome. It achieves this by using a graded
notion of responsibility determined by the number of changes needed to render a player
pivotal for the outcome. The approach does not allow, however, for graded attributions of
responsibility with regard to players who are already pivotal. Nonetheless, certain cases
generate a strong intuition that pivotal individuals in different situations are not regarded
as equally responsible. Consider the classic bystander effect (Latan  e & Darley, 1968): A
victim is attacked by an offender and is in need of help. Several observers are in a posi-
tion to potentially intervene. As is well known, people have a reduced sense of responsi-
bility when there are others who could also help compared to a situation in which there
is no one else. However, note that the structural model does not predict this effect. The
structure of the situation is disjunctive (assuming that one person would be enough to
fend off the offender) and thus each person is pivotal for the negative outcome, irrespec-
tive of the number of people present.
This intuition can be accommodated within the structural framework by incorporating
the concept of prospective responsibility: the extent to which a person is perceived to be
critical for an outcome before it has occurred. Accordingly, the reason why a single per-
son will be held more responsible for not helping a stranger than each individual in a
group of people, is that the single person could have prevented the outcome (he was piv-
otal) and he knew that the nature of the outcome only depended on him (he was more
critical). Thus, retrospective responsibility is not only inﬂuenced by whether a person
was pivotal after the fact but also by how critical a person was perceived to be prior to
the outcome.
We show that incorporating the notion of criticality explains additional deviations from
the predictions of the structural model and we present a new experiment to test the respec-
tive roles of criticality and (distance from) pivotality in intuitive judgments of responsibility.
The new framework subsumes the “multiple-paths to pivotality” model introduced and
tested in Zultan et al. (2012). As we shall see, prospective responsibility reﬂects different
possible ways in which one can be pivotal, and as such is closely related to the multiple-
paths model. In particular, the new framework predicts the patterns observed in Zultan
et al.’s experiments. However, the new proposal goes beyond the multiple-paths model
insofar as it explicitly incorporates people’s judgments of criticality. Thus, it predicts that
retrospective responsibility assignments can differ even when agents are equally pivotal
for the outcome.
3.1. Models of criticality
Let us summarize the key intuitions with respect to criticality: An individual’s per-
ceived criticality diminishes with an increased number of people in disjunctive structures
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outcome. However, an individual’s criticality is not expected to decrease with an
increased group size for conjunctive tasks. Regardless of the number of conjuncts, each
individual’s action is still necessary for the team outcome. To illustrate, imagine that a
victim is attacked by three offenders and three observers are present, each of whom
would need to intervene in order to help the victim. Here, the intuition is that each of the
observers is highly critical for preventing the outcome (and more critical than in a situa-
tion in which only one offender was present but there were still three observers).
So far we have relied on intuitive perceptions of criticality and have not given a
formal model of criticality. We now consider different ways in which the intuitions
discussed above can be formalized and generalized. These will allow us to deﬁne a criti-
cality-pivotality framework to be tested in a new experiment. We consider two possible
models of criticality, which we shall refer to as the expected pivotality model and the
heuristic model. These models are intended as an example for how criticality can be
formalized and incorporated into a model of retrospective responsibility. Other
approaches to criticality may be just as valid as the ones we discuss here. We will
mention one such alternative approach when discussing the heuristic model.
The expected pivotality model is based on Rapoport (1987), who provides a deﬁnition
of the criticality of a person’s contribution in the step-level public goods game. In this
game, each person in a group is endowed with an initial amount of money, let’s say $5.
Each person then indicates whether he or she wants to contribute money to the public
good. If a sufﬁcient number of people provide their endowment and the provision point is
met, the public good is provided (e.g., each person gets an additional $10). The public
good is available to all in the group, no matter whether they contributed their endowment.
According to Rapoport’s (1987) deﬁnition, a player’s criticality is given by the probabil-
ity that his or her contribution will make a difference to the outcome. In the step-level
public goods game, this is the probability that the number of contributors among the other
players is exactly one less than the number required to provide the public good, given the
prior probabilities regarding contributions in the group. In our more general setup, this is
equivalent to the ex ante probability that a player’s contribution will be pivotal.
Does this deﬁnition of criticality as “expected pivotality” capture our intuitions with
regard to the examples described above? It correctly predicts that an individual’s critical-
ity reduces with an increased group size in disjunctive situations. However, contrary to
intuition, the model also predicts that criticality will be similarly reduced in conjunctive
tasks. To see why, note that in disjunctive tasks, a player is pivotal if none of the other
players succeed. In comparison, in conjunctive tasks, a player is pivotal if all of the other
players succeed. Assuming that a player is maximally uncertain about whether or not the
others will succeed, the probability of him being pivotal is the same in the disjunctive
and conjunctive tasks and reduces with the size of the group.
The second model of criticality we consider is a simple heuristic model. This model
assigns full criticality to players whose success is necessary for the team outcome and
divides the criticality equally between players who share a task in a disjunctive fashion.
This is best illustrated via the asymmetric task structure used in Zultan et al. (2012) and
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tasks in addition to at least one player out of A and B. The heuristic model assigns full
criticality to C and D, whereas A and B only receive a criticality of 0.5 each, because
their contributions combine in a disjunctive manner.
Another way to formalize the importance of a player whose success is necessary for
the team to win is to model criticality as the relative decrease in the probability of the
team winning when the player fails. For example, this notion of criticality can be deﬁned
as 1  
pðwinjfailÞ
pðwinjsuccessÞ According to this deﬁnition, a player’s criticality varies from zero
(when he has no effect on the team outcome) to one (when he is necessary for the team
to win). The predictions of this model for the deterministic situations to be explored in
the next section are virtually identical to the predictions of the heuristic model. We will,
therefore, not discuss it separately in the following, but present it here as an illustration
for how models of criticality can be extended to encompass non-deterministic
situations.
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3.2. Testing the criticality-pivotality model of retrospective responsibility
We designed a new experiment to investigate the inﬂuence of both criticality and pivo-
tality on participants’ responsibility attributions. We hypothesized that participants’
responsibility attributions would not only be affected by how close a player’s contribution
was to being pivotal but also by how critical this player’s contribution was perceived for
the group outcome. Formally,
responsibilityðA;O;SÞ¼fðcriticalityðA;SÞ;pivotalityðA;O;SÞÞ
where criticality(A,S) denotes the criticality of player A in situation S and pivotality(A, O, S)
denotes A’s pivotality for the outcome O in situation S. In the following experimental
study, we illustrate how the general framework can be applied using the different models
of criticality and pivotality discussed above.
In the experiment, 40 participants (25 female) aged 18–60 (M = 33.86, SD = 11.76)
were recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
14 They evaluated the performance of
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Fig. 4. Causal structure of asymmetric example with the predictions of the heuristic criticality model.
1056 D. A. Lagnado, T. Gerstenberg, R. Zultan/Cognitive Science 37 (2014)contestants in a game show in which players played the dot-clicking game (for details see
above discussion of Zultan et al., 2012) and were randomly assigned to team challenges
that differed in terms of group size and structure (see Fig. 5).
In the ﬁrst part of the experiment, participants viewed four different challenges on the
same screen and were asked to answer the following question: “How critical is Player A
for the team’s outcome in each challenge?” Participants made their judgments on separate
sliders, which were positioned under the four different challenges. The endpoints of the
sliders were labeled “not at all” and “very much.”
Participants’ criticality judgments are shown in Fig. 6. The heuristic model
(r = .97, RMSE = 11.15) predicted participants’ criticality judgments very well and better
than the expected pivotality model (r = .62, RMSE = 37.42). Generally, player A was
rated highly critical when his individual success was necessary for the team win (cf. chal-
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D. A. Lagnado, T. Gerstenberg, R. Zultan/Cognitive Science 37 (2014) 1057lenges 2 and 4 in Fig. 6A and B). When A formed part of a disjunctive (sub-)group, criti-
cality reduced with the number of people in the group (cf. challenges 1 and 3 in Fig. 6A
and B).
In the second part of the experiment, participants saw the results of four different
group challenges simultaneously on the screen (see Fig. 7A) and answered the following
question: “How responsible is Player A for the team’s result in the different situations?”
Participants indicated their responses on separate sliders whose endpoints were labeled
“not at all” and “very much.”
As a reminder, Fig. 7B shows the predictions of the Structural Model for four simple
situations. As outlined above, the model predicts that in a situation in which two players
failed their tasks, A’s responsibility is 1 in a disjunctive challenge and 1/2 in a conjunc-
tive challenge. Conversely, the model predicts that when both players succeeded, A’s
responsibility is 1/2 for disjunction and 1 for conjunction. However, remember that peo-
ple perceive A to be more critical for the team’s outcome in the conjunctive versus the
disjunctive challenge.
In the experiment, participants saw nine sets of challenges, which were chosen to
manipulate pivotality while keeping criticality constant and vice versa.
15 Fig. 8 shows
participants’ responsibility judgments for two sets of challenges that incorporate the four
situations shown in Fig. 7B. The structural model predicts participants’ responsibility
attributions well for the situations shown in Fig. 8A but not for those in Fig. 8B. Note,
however, that in Fig. 8A, criticality (as predicted by the heuristic model which explains
participants’ criticality attributions best) and pivotality are perfectly confounded, whereas
in Fig. 8B, criticality and pivotality are negatively correlated. In this latter set of
challenges, participants attributed more responsibility when A failed in conjunctive tasks
versus disjunctive tasks, in sharp contrast to the predictions of the structural model. For
example, although n = 3 changes would be necessary to make A pivotal when four play-
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Fig. 7. (A) Screenshot of the experiment and (B) predictions of A’s responsibility by the structural model
for disjunctive versus conjunctive tasks in which two players failed ( ) or succeeded ( ).
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in the situation in which four players failed in the disjunctive challenge (Situation 3),
although A is pivotal in this situation. Note that the “multiple-paths model” (Zultan et al.,
2012) also predicts that A will be held more responsible in Situation 3 than in Situation
4. The multiple-paths model assigns full responsibility to pivotal players (Situation 4)
and, given that there is only one way to make A pivotal in Situation 3, makes the same
prediction as the structural model in this case. However, our novel criticality-pivotality
framework can account for participants’ attributions by assuming that participants’
weighed criticality more heavily than pivotality in this set of patterns. The fact that non-
pivotal players are sometimes attributed more responsibility than pivotal players high-
lights the importance of criticality considerations for people’s attributions.
From this pattern of results, one might infer that pivotality is not essential for attribu-
tions of responsibility, because participants’ attributions closely follow the predictions of
the criticality heuristic. However, our design also included situations in which A’s criti-
cality was held constant but his pivotality varied. If pivotality is not important, then A’s
responsibility should be the same in these situations. Consider the set of challenges
shown in Fig. 9A. Because the structure of the challenge did not vary between situations,
A’s criticality is equal in all four situations. However, participants attributed more respon-
sibility to A when he was pivotal (Situations 3 and 4) compared to when he was not piv-
otal (Situations 1 and 2), t(39) = 6.63, p < .001, r = .53. In fact, the pattern of
attributions here exactly follow the predictions of the structural model: A’s responsibility
is lowest in Situation 1 (M = 48, SD = 33.75) where n=2changes are required to make
him pivotal. A’s responsibility increases slightly in Situation 2 (M = 57.55, SD = 32.92)
as N is reduced to 1. Responsibility further increases signiﬁcantly in Situation 3
(M = 82.05, SD = 26.34) in which A is pivotal and only minimally in Situation 4
(M = 90.03, SD = 20.82).
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pivotality was the same but his criticality differed. In Situations 1 and 2, N=2is required
to make A pivotal. However, A is more critical in Situation 2 than in Situation 1. Partici-
pants judged A signiﬁcantly more responsible for the team’s loss in Situation 2 (M = 54.18,
SD = 34.29) than in Situation 1 (M = 31.43, SD = 23.98), t(39) = 6.01, p < .001, r = .48.
In Situations 3 and 4 A’s pivotality is 1/2; however, A is more critical in Situation 4 than in
Situation 3. Participants judged A signiﬁcantly more responsible in Situation 4 (M = 66.35,
SD = 36.41) than in Situation 3 (M = 25.13, SD = 21.38), t(39) = 9.09, p < .001, r = .68.
Taken together, the four sets of challenges discussed so far establish that responsibil-
ity attributions to individuals within a group are affected both by how critical the person
is perceived to be and by how close he was to being pivotal. When criticality is held
constant (cf. Fig. 9A), responsibility increases with pivotality. When pivotality is held
constant (cf. Fig. 9B), responsibility increases with criticality. Thus, neither criticality
nor pivotality alone is sufﬁcient to explain responsibility attributions. This conclusion
holds regardless of the particular models of criticality and pivotality used. In the follow-
ing section, we proceed to illustrate how speciﬁc models can be employed to derive
quantitative predictions about how responsible an individual will be judged in different
situations.
3.3. Testing the criticality-pivotality framework
We ﬁrst test how well simple models that do not combine criticality and pivotality
can explain participants’ responsibility attributions. For models for criticality, we con-
sider the expected pivotality model and heuristic model described above. For models of
pivotality, we consider a simple counterfactual model, which only assigns responsibility
to pivotal players and the structural model, which assigns responsibility as a function of
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predict participants’ responsibility attributions in the experiment. In general, the two
pivotality models predict participants’ attributions better than the two criticality models.
More precisely, the structural model predicts participants’ attributions best followed by
the simple counterfactual model, the heuristic model, and the expected pivotality model.
We also considered models that predicted responsibility as a weighted function of criti-
cality and pivotality. Thus,
ResponsibiltyðAÞ¼a þ W   CriticalityðAÞþð 1   WÞ pivotalityðAÞ;
where a is a global intercept and w is a weighting parameter whose range is constrained
from 0 to 1.
16 The cells off the main diagonal in Table 1 show the model ﬁts for these
weighted models. Overall, a model that uses the heuristic criticality model and the struc-
tural pivotality model explains participants’ attributions best. However, a model that
replaces the structural pivotality model with a counterfactual pivotality model also
explains the data well. This is not surprising, given that the predictions of the structural
and counterfactual model are strongly correlated (r = .97) for the set of situations we
employed. As a check, we also included weighted models that combined two models
from the same family (i.e., two criticality models or two pivotality models). These models
perform much worse than those that combine one model from the criticality family with
one model from the pivotality family.
Although the overall correlations of several combinations of models are high, the
speciﬁc sets of challenges we have discussed so far support a combination of the critical-
ity heuristic with the structural model of pivotality. For example, the pattern of attribu-
tions in Fig. 9A in which criticality was held constant is captured by the structural model
of pivotality but not the simple counterfactual model. The simple counterfactual model
cannot predict that A is held responsible, even in situations in which he was not pivotal.
Similarly, participants’ judgments for the situation shown in Fig. 8B cannot be explained
if the expected pivotality model is used as a model of criticality, but it follows naturally
when the heuristic model is used. The expected pivotality model cannot predict this pat-
Table 1
Correlations (with RMSE in parentheses) of criticality models and pivotality models with participants’ respon-
sibility attributions
Criticality Pivotality
Expected Pivotality Heuristic Simple Counterfactual Structural
Expected pivotality 0.59 (24.44) –– –
Heuristic 0.71 (19.57) 0.67 (22.41) ––
Simple counterfactual 0.83 (16.12) 0.89 (13.92) 0.74 (36.14) –
Structural 0.84 (13.66) 0.90 (10.81) 0.74 (16.55) 0.77 (19.59)
Note. Cells on the diagonal show predictions of simple models; cells off the diagonal show predictions of
combined models.
D. A. Lagnado, T. Gerstenberg, R. Zultan/Cognitive Science 37 (2014) 1061tern since it assigns equal criticality to players in disjunctive and conjunctive structures
as discussed above. Fig. 10 shows the ﬁve remaining sets of challenges. We will not dis-
cuss these patterns of results in any detail; however, the patterns of attributions within
each given set of challenges is consistent with the critical-pivotality model that combines
the heuristic with the structural model. This is seen by comparing the actual judgments
(white bars) with the critical-pivotality model (gray bars). In contrast, for each of the
other possible combinations of models, there are qualitative patterns that cannot be
explained.
Thus, the overall results of the experiment show that participants’ responsibility are
very well explained by assuming that they take into account both: (a) how critical a per-
son’s contribution was for the group outcome, and (b) whether or not a person’s contribu-
tion would have made a difference to the outcome (and if not, how close it was to
making a difference). As noted above, we have applied a heuristic model of criticality,
but a more sophisticated probabilistic model yields equivalent results. It also has the ben-
eﬁt of generalizing to more complex structures. Our framework assumes a simple linear
combination of both criticality and pivotality. Future research is required to develop a
reﬁned model of criticality and combine both criticality and pivotality into an integrated
model of responsibility attribution.
4. General discussion
This article had two major aims: (a) to introduce the structural model approach as a
framework for exploring attributions of causal responsibility; and (b) to present and
empirically test a new model of intuitive judgments of responsibility that combines both
pivotality and criticality. Before summarizing the new model in the conclusions section,
we will consider the generalizability of the ﬁndings and some future extensions of the
model and new directions for research.
4.1. Generalizability of responsibility model
For the simple cases that we have investigated so far, people appear to make stable
and systematic attributions that can be captured by a few well-motivated principles (e.g.,
pivotality and criticality), with causal structure playing an important role. An important
line for future research is to investigate whether these principles scale-up to more com-
plex cases (or when additional factors, such as intentions and foresight are introduced).
For example, what happens when there are more complicated causal structures, with
dependencies between agents, such as hierarchical structures (e.g., a management
structure and their employees; a coach and the team players)? What about contexts that
involve sequential rather than simultaneous subtasks (Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2012) or
where the agents differ in their capabilities (Gerstenberg, Ejova, & Lagnado, 2011)? As
noted in the introduction to this article, these more complex contexts raise many intrigu-
ing questions. It is possible that the current principles (e.g., of pivotality and criticality)
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Fig. 10. Mean responsibility ratings (white bars) for the remaining ﬁve sets of challenges with the predic-
tions of the critical-pivotality model (gray bars) and the structural model (black bars).
Note:C= Criticality; P = Pivotality. Error bars indicate  1 SE.
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work, understood as a ﬂexible and guiding framework, helps us formulate and examine
many of these questions empirically. This connects with some of the criticisms leveled
by Glymour et al. (2010) at the philosophical accounts of actual causation based on struc-
tural models. As noted above, we agree with Glymour et al. that the search for a set of
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions to deﬁne actual causation is not the most appropriate
strategy. This holds for psychological theorizing even more than philosophical theorizing.
Instead, the development and testing of core principles, with room for contextual and
individual differences, seems more appropriate and is consistent with theorizing in other
areas of psychology.
This connects with a related question about the possibility of individual differences in
people’s attributions. Although people’s judgments appear robust for the simple cases, it
is likely that there might be individual differences in people’s intuitive attributions for
more complex cases (especially when different principles might be in tension). Here
again, a ﬂexible overarching framework can accommodate these differences in a princi-
pled way. For example, the explicit model-dependence espoused by the structural frame-
work provides one route to deal with individual differences (in particular, when scenarios
are under-described, and thus allow people to ﬁll in the gaps in different ways). Another
route is to investigate different “parameter” settings of the model, for example, differen-
tial weighting of the exact combination of pivotality versus criticality in retrospective
responsibility judgments. These questions have not been systematically explored but sug-
gest a fruitful area for future research.
4.1.1. Shared versus group responsibility
Although the experiments in this article have looked at team games, the focus has been
on individual causal responsibility within a team. However, an important aspect of legal
accounts of responsibility is the distinction between shared and group responsibility
(Cane, 2002). The former is still based on individual responsibility: Each individual
shares responsibility for an event. In contrast, the latter treats the group as an independent
entity. Applied to the barrister siege example presented in the introduction, the inquest
investigated the individual responsibility of each marksman for the barrister’s death, but
did not examine group responsibility overall. Some of the jury recommendations, how-
ever, seemed to be directed at the police as a group entity. Criminal law deals predomi-
nantly with individual or shared responsibility, although there are exceptions (e.g., ﬁnding
corporations guilty of manslaughter in large-scale transport disasters). The theoretical and
empirical work in this article has also concentrated on individual and shared responsibil-
ity (i.e., the distribution among individuals), but there are many interesting questions that
could be asked about the notion of group responsibility, too.
4.1.2. Hierarchical structures
Another restriction in the current article is the use of simple group structures, where
the causes are independent (i.e., separate agents succeeding or failing in their own task).
But in many group situations, the causal structure is more complex, including causal
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cation of responsibility, the hierarchal structure of the group is often crucial (e.g., boss
and employees; manager and players; commanders and soldiers). For example, in the
inquest into the barrister siege case, the jury did not ﬁnd the individual marksmen legally
responsible but directed blame at the police’s overall handling of the event. The attribu-
tion of responsibility in hierarchical structures is a controversial and fascinating issue, but
it has received sparse attention in the psychological literature (see Hamilton, 1978, 1986).
We believe that the structural model framework is readily extended to address such hier-
archical contexts (see Halpern & Hitchcock, unpublished data, for suggestions in this
direction).
4.2. Model-dependence of responsibility judgments
On the structural model approach, responsibility judgments are explicitly model depen-
dent. Thus, even when presented with an identical scenario people might construct different
models and hence legitimately differ in their responsibility judgments. In the experiments
used so far (e.g., the dot-clicking game), the causal structures were clear and unambiguous,
so it is unlikely that participants constructed different causal models. However, in richer
and more complex cases, people might differ in their causal models and hence also in their
responsibility attributions. As noted above, this is one route by which individual differences
in judgments might be explained, especially in complex contexts with multiple causal fac-
tors. To investigate this issue, future work could independently elicit peoples’ causal mod-
els (and thus directly investigate the effect of model choice on responsibility attributions).
More generally, the question of how people build causal models of complex situations is
under-researched (see Fenton, Neil, & Lagnado, 2012, for a proposal in the legal context).
4.3. Unit of change
Another important component of the structural model is the number of changes needed
to make an agent pivotal to the outcome. Chockler and Halpern (2004) rely on examples
where the unit of change is straightforward—either single votes in the election example,
or shooting versus not shooting in the marksman example. More generally, the structural
model framework suggests that one clear-cut unit of change is the value of a variable.
This is readily applied to the dot-clicking game explored in our studies (and numerous
real-world contexts). The simplest case is when all variables are binary, so a single
change involves switching the value of a single variable (e.g., changing a player from
failure to success in their individual task). Things are more complicated when the vari-
ables are multi-valued, as in the triangle game. One unit of change is the point score
(deviation) of an individual player; another could be a wholesale change in the player’s
score. The choice of unit here can make a difference to assignments of responsibility
because it can entail different numbers of changes required for pivotality. For example,
consider the Max condition in the triangle game, where each player’s individual deviation
from the correct answer must be less than 3. Compare two cases in which A and B are
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player B deviates by 5. Is player A equally responsible in both cases? If the unit of
change is at the level of player, then in both cases only one change is required to make
A pivotal, namely, to switch player B so that his score is under the threshold. However,
if the unit of change is deviation points, then a greater number of changes is needed in
case (b) than (a), and thus player A is assigned less responsibility in case (b).
This example highlights the fact that the level of grain of the unit of change can affect
how many changes are needed for pivotality, and thus the degree of responsibility
assigned. It is not a criticism of the structural approach, but it does show that care needs
to be taken in deﬁning the unit of change for any given context—and suggests that this
might be a signiﬁcant factor in people’s own intuitive judgments.
As well as considering changes to values of variables, it is possible to consider more
substantial changes, such as modiﬁcations to the causal models. This might involve the
introduction of new variables, or changes to the causal relations or functions between
variables. An example of the former is given in the siege example, where the possibility
of the shooting victim (the barrister) being placed directly into an intensive care unit was
considered. An example of the latter would be imagining a change in the rules in the tri-
angle game or dot-clicking game. As noted above, such changes need to be treated with
care, because they have the potential to substantially alter attributions of responsibility.
Here again, proponents of the structural approach have argued that disputes about respon-
sibility often do boil down to disputes about the correct or most appropriate causal model
of the situation in question (Chockler & Halpern, 2004; Halpern & Hitchcock, 2010;
Halpern & Pearl, 2005). This is another area that is ripe for psychological investigation.
We suspect that people are adept at constructing causal models and counterfactual worlds
that favor their own stake in a debate about responsibility.
4.4. Changes away from pivotality
According to the structural account an agent that is pivotal for the outcome is assigned
full responsibility. However, there are situations where people systematically assign dif-
ferent degrees of responsibility to pivotal agents. We have already seen this in cases
where agents differ in terms of their criticality. But there are also situations in which piv-
otal agents are equally criticality and yet receive differential attributions of responsibility.
This is clearly shown in the results of the triangle game, where responsibility ratings were
proportional to players’ deviations scores even for players that all satisfy the same crite-
rion. For example, consider the Min condition in the triangle game, where the team wins
if at least one player gets the correct answer. On rounds where no one succeeds, all play-
ers are pivotal to the team loss, and thus according to the structural model each player is
assigned full responsibility (Resp = 1). But the empirical data show that people are
sensitive to how far each player is from the correct score, and assign responsibility in
proportion to this deviation. A similar argument applies for the responsibility ratings for
wins in the Max condition. Even though all players are pivotal for the win, those that
deviate less from the correct answer are accorded greater responsibility for the win.
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otal causes. A natural extension to the structural model here is to consider changes
away from pivotality as well as changes to pivotality. Thus, parallel to the notion that
the responsibility assigned to an agent depends on the number of changes needed to
make the agent pivotal for the outcome, one could add the condition that the responsi-
bility assigned to pivotal agents depends on the number of changes needed to make
them non-pivotal for the outcome. In particular, the more changes it takes to move an
agent away from pivotality, the more blame they acquire for a loss or credit for a
win.
This analysis is readily applied to the triangle game examples. In the Min condition, if
player A deviates by 1 and player B deviates by 5, both are pivotal for the team’s loss
(changing either player to 0 would switch the loss to a win), but player A requires fewer
changes (in deviation points) than player B to make him non-pivotal for the loss. Thus, A
is attributed less responsibility for the loss than B (which ﬁts with the empirical data).
Similarly, in the Max condition, suppose all players deviate by less than 3, so all are piv-
otal for the win. If player A deviates by 1, and player B by 2, then less changes are
required to make B non-pivotal. Thus, B is assigned less responsibility for the win (which
ﬁts the empirical data).
Furthermore, we also see evidence for this proposal in the data of the novel experi-
ment. Consider, for example, the set of challenges shown in Fig. 10C. A’s criticality and
pivotality is the same in situations 2–4. However, participants blamed A signiﬁcantly
more for the loss in situation 4 (M = 95.08, SD = 11.89) in which three changes away
from pivotality were required compared to, for example, situation 2 in which only one
change would have rendered A non-pivotal (M = 84.05, SD = 21.6), t(39), = 2.94,
p = .006, r = .18. Consider the set of challenges shown in Fig. 10D and compare the
credit that A received in situation 2 versus situation 4. A is fully critical and pivotal in
both situations. However, participants attribute signiﬁcantly more credit to A in situation
4( M=83.78, SD = 23.44) compared to situation 2 (M=72.30, SD = 27.87), t(39), =
4.75, p < .001, r = .37. This effect is not predicted by the new responsibility model but
can be explained by using the notion of robust pivotality. Whereas only one change
would already render A non-pivotal in situation 2 (i.e., changing B), three changes are
required to render A non-pivotal in situation 4.
The notion of “changes away from pivotality” seems a viable extension to the respon-
sibility model, and will be pursued in future work. It also meshes with the idea that a
causal relation can be assessed in terms of its robustness (or insensitivity) to external
inﬂuences and circumstances (Woodward, 2006).
4.5. Changes as causes
One potential shortcoming of the structural deﬁnition of actual causation is that it
seems to neglect an important aspect of actual causation—the sense in which a cause is
often a change in state (rather than just an instantiation of a variable). Thus, Glymour
et al. (2010) argue that the deﬁnitions of actual cause given by Halpern and Pearl (2005)
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to think of causes as changes, or happenings.”
17 For instance, Halpern and Pearl explic-
itly state that “events” on their account correspond to sets of possible worlds rather than
changes in states. For them, therefore, actual causation is a relation between static states
(variable values), and changes in states are only introduced in the counterfactual part of
their analysis. Glymour et al. argue that this leaves out the critical notion of a change in
state, and they point out that actual cause judgments can be sensitive to the prior state of
the system (such that a causal model with an identical set of variable values can lead to
different actual cause judgments depending on which state preceded it). Glymour et al.
maintain that these shortcomings can be dealt with by viewing the causal model frame-
work from a different perspective, one based on state transitions and taking into account
prior system states.
We agree that the notion of state change is often crucial to judgments of actual causa-
tion, and that the current family of structural models does not capture this in a natural
way (cf. Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado, & Tenenbaum, 2012). But as Glymour et al.
point out, a different perspective on the causal model framework, which takes state
changes (and prior system states) as basic components, can readily accommodate this.
Indeed, this suggests a novel line of psychological research where prior system states are
varied while holding constant the actual model and variable values. Along with Glymour
et al.’s intuitions, we expect people to be likewise sensitive to these initial states. All of
the studies reported in this article have a default starting state for the system (before any-
one does anything), so the potential dependence on prior states does not present an issue.
However, future studies could explore this interesting factor.
5. Conclusions
This article has explored the structural model account of causal responsibility, with
particular focus on simple multiple agent games. We have proposed a novel model of
intuitive attribution that takes into account both backward- and forward-looking aspects
of responsibility. Given a causal model of the situation, and knowledge about the actions
of the agents and the outcome, people look backward to see whether an agent was pivotal
(or close to pivotal) for the outcome. But they also factor in how critical the agents were
in the ﬁrst place, before these actions were taken. This combination of retrospective and
prospective responsibility is intuitively plausible and captures participants’ judgments in
our empirical studies. It also parallels legal conceptions of responsibility, where theorists
distinguish retrospective (historic) and prospective functions of legal responsibility (Cane,
2002). Indeed, Cane (2002) argues that the primary function of the law is to “tell us what
are responsibilities are” (prospective responsibility), and that holding people accountable
for their failures to do this (retrospective responsibility) is a secondary concern (Cane,
2002, p. 63). We speculate that intuitive judgments of responsibility might also be best
understood in terms of forward-looking goals, with the retributional aspect serving as a
means to this end.
1068 D. A. Lagnado, T. Gerstenberg, R. Zultan/Cognitive Science 37 (2014)Highlighting the prospective as well as retrospective components of responsibility attri-
butions also cements the central role played by causal models—which serve both a strong
predictive purpose, and an explanatory and attributional role in human cognition. The
causal model framework, however it is characterized in detail, is ideally suited to this
role. It allows us to predict the consequences of future actions, as well as to identify the
causes of outcomes that have already occurred.
As noted in the article, there are various factors that the structural model approaches,
in their current formulation, do not cover. There are also potential limitations with their
speciﬁc deﬁnitions of actual cause, and perhaps with the search for any deﬁnition tied to
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions. Irrespective of these challenges we believe that the
causal model approach furnishes us with a ﬂexible framework to explore both formal and
psychological theories of causal attribution. Indeed, there is a fruitful interplay between
the formal developments and the empirical data on people’s intuitive judgments. The pro-
cess of discovering a principled equilibrium between formal and empirical accounts is
underway.
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Notes
1. This is a real case that took place in London, May 6, 2008. For details of the inquest,
see: http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/documents/investigation_commissioner_reports/saunders
-21-12-10.pdf
2. Legal theorists and practitioners are aware of the shortcomings of this deﬁnition,
and there are further requirements for causality in law (Moore, 2009).
3. Here, variables can refer to properties, event types, or propositions. For our current
purposes, we can sidestep philosophical questions about the exact nature of the
causal relata, although this does raise some important issues when considering
actual causation. A key issue is the interpretation of an event (whether in terms of
a set of possible worlds or a transition between states). This is discussed in more
detail later in the article.
4. This is not intended as a rigorous deﬁnition—see Pearl (2000/2009) and Woodward
(2003) for more explicit deﬁnitions.
5. This sounds circular (i.e., that we are assuming what we want to show), but note
that so far we are just setting up the general-level causal model and have made no
claims about the values of the variables or ascriptions of actual causality. However,
D. A. Lagnado, T. Gerstenberg, R. Zultan/Cognitive Science 37 (2014) 1069it does highlight that the structural model approach is not offering a reductive
account of causality but rather representing our causal claims. Also, note that the
coroner in the siege case is making a judgment about the appropriate form of the
causal function to apply in that case, and from that the actual cause assignments
follow. He is not simply evaluating, but looking at the causal (physiological) pro-
cesses that led to the barrister’s death.
6. See Sloman and Lagnado (2005) for empirical data showing that people endorse
such reasoning.
7. On the structural model account, an event (or state of affairs) corresponds to the
assignment of a value to a variable, for example, BA = 1 represents that the barris-
ter aims his shotgun at police. According to Halpern and Pearl (2005), an event is
a set of possible worlds (rather than a change from one state of affairs to another).
Thus, for them actual causation concerns a relation between one set of variable val-
ues (the causes) and another set (the effects).
8. Here we deﬁne “pivotality” in terms of counterfactual dependence: “c is pivotal for
e” is equivalent to “e counterfactually depends on c.”
9. The CH account is not restricted to human agents; it covers multiple causes more
generally (e.g., it is applied to fault diagnosis in complex computer systems). How-
ever, we will focus on human agents in this article.
10. It is worth noting that a simple alternative account of the voting situation would
be the diffusion of responsibility, because fewer members vote for A in the 6–5
case, and perhaps there is a “ﬁxed” amount of responsibility to be shared. We
shall see later that this by itself does not explain people’s patterns of attribution.
Also, it seems to be undermined by comparing a 6–5 outcome with a 3–0 out-
come (given a committee of three). A simple “ﬁxed sum” diffusion model would
give members in the 3–0 vote a higher degree of responsibility, but the CH model
would give a higher degree to members in the 6–5 case.
11. Note that conjunction and disjunction are counterparts in the sense that a game
that has a conjunctive function for wins has a disjunctive function for losses, and
vice versa. For example, if a conjunction of passes is required for the team to
win, then a single fail is sufﬁcient for the team to lose. Likewise, if a single pass
is sufﬁcient for a team to win (disjunction), then a conjunction of fails incurs a
team loss.
12. The failure of player D ensured that manipulating the individual outcomes of the
other players between conditions never renders any of them pivotal.
13. It should be noted that the heuristic model does not readily extend to more com-
plex structures; therefore, a more sophisticated model, such as the probabilistic
model mentioned here, is needed for full generality. However, for present pur-
poses the key point is that retrospective attributions appear to depend on criticality
as well as pivotality.
14. A demo of the experiment can be accessed here: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagna
do-lab/experiments/demos/structure_demo.html.
1070 D. A. Lagnado, T. Gerstenberg, R. Zultan/Cognitive Science 37 (2014)15. This is strictly true in some sets of challenges, whereas others exhibit some corre-
lation between criticality (as predicted by the heuristic model) and pivotality (as
predicted by the structural model). The overall correlation for the 36 challenges
used for example, in the experiment was low with r = .29.
16. For the model predictions of the critical-pivotality model in Figs. 8, 9, and 10 we
used the heuristic as a model of criticality and the structural model as a model of
pivotality. Furthermore, we allowed w to vary between the different sets of chal-
lenges.
17. A similar point is made by Steward (2010) when discussing the ontology of cau-
sation, where she distinguishes three categories of cause: “makers-happen,” “mat-
terers,” and “movers.” The structural deﬁnition of Halpern and Pearl (2005)
focuses on “matterers,” whereas the notion of change or happening proposed by
Glymour et al. corresponds to “makers-happen” in Steward’s taxonomy.
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